

# Bitcoin: Design, Properties, & Challenges



# Overview

- Brief History/Overview of previous attempts at Electronic Cash
- Primitives & Concepts relevant to Bitcoin
- Whitepaper Definition - “Purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash”
- How well does the Whitepaper Definition hold in the real world?
- Attacks
- Protocol Developments & Scaling

# An (Incomplete) History

- 1982, Chaum, Blind Signature for Untraceable Payments

Blind Signatures from Banks as means of Payer/Payee Anonymity

- 1998, Wei Dai, B-money


Keypairs as Pseudonyms, Decentralized Issuance

- 2005, Ian Grigg, Triple Entry Accounting

Records stored by payer/payee and in a central list

# Primitives & Concepts


- ECDSA Keypairs (via secp256k1)
- Cryptographically secure hash functions (SHA256 & RIPEMD160)
- Proof-of-Work (Based on Adam Back's Hashcash)
- “Blockchain”
- Merkle Trees
- Hash Chain
- Double spending



Transactions Hashed in a Merkle Tree


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


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
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
# Primitives & Concepts



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


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


# Satoshi Whitepaper


We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the coin. A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of ownership.



The solution we propose begins with a timestamp server. A timestamp server works by taking a hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishing the hash, such as in a newspaper or Usenet post [2-5]. The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the time, obviously, in order to get into the hash. Each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in its hash, forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it.





For our timestamp network, we implement the proof-of-work by incrementing a nonce in the block until a value is found that gives the block's hash the required zero bits. Once the CPU effort has been expended to make it satisfy the proof-of-work, the block cannot be changed without redoing the work. As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block would include redoing all the blocks after it.





# Important Network Parameters

- Difficulty Readjustment
- Block rewards
- UTXO set
- Every 2016 blocks (~2 weeks)
- Start at 50 Bitcoins, halved every 210,000 blocks (~4 years)



# Real-World Network

- It works!
- Multi-billion dollar network
- Censorship-resistant asset & currency
- P2P network of 1,000s of full nodes
- 100s of MW of electricity dedicated to mining
- Development of ASICs
- Limited throughput
- **NOT ANONYMOUS**

# Real-World Network II

Different levels of Participation:

- Solo Miner + Full Node
- Pooled Miner + Full Node
- Full Node
- Light/SPV Client
- Web Wallet
- Pooled Miner

Bitcoin as an industry:

- Exchanges
- Miners
- Standalone Wallets
- Web Wallets
- Blockchain Explorers
- Infrastructure

# Real-World Network III

## Complex Political Situation:

- ~5 people with commit access
- <10 entities control supermajority of hashrate
- Core-centric culture & development
- “Bitcoin is healthier than ever in that everything is contentious and hard” - Cory Fields

# Attacks

- 51% - Control a majority of the hashrate on the network
  - Censor transactions, double spend with decent probability, “Finney attack”
  - Worst-case scenario for network – Assumption made in whitepaper is “majority of nodes are honest”
- Block Withholding – Increase miner centralization
  - Reduce profit for miners not in your cartel
  - Similar strategy seen in Selfish Mining attacks


# Attacks II

- Spam – Spend bitcoin to flood the network with many small, hard-to-process transactions
  - Now limits on maximum standard transaction size
  - In the past, miners & devs have communicated well to identify & filter spam (not ideal)
- Sybil – Control many nodes on the network
  - Can refuse to relay blocks and transactions, or relay only false blocks & transactions
  - DoS miners, pools, popular nodes, company nodes
  - Eclipse attacks, a variant, focus on monopolizing connections to a specific node

# Protocol Developments

- Simplified Payment Verification (SPV)
  - Store and query only for information relevant to you
  - Popular for mobile devices
- Pay-to-Other Hashes!
  - Make use of Bitcoin scripting & opcodes for more complex transactions (via ScriptSig)
  - Multisignature transactions, timelocked outputs, etc.
- Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets

BIP 32 - Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets



# Scaling-Focused Developments

- Segregated Witness
  - Transaction Inputs/Outputs determine blockchain state; everything else is just needed for validation
  - Create a new Merkle Tree of validation data (scripts, signatures, etc.) and put the root in the block header
  - Downloading validation data is now optional (!)
- Invertible Bloom Lookup Tables (IBLT)
  - Most blocks contain transactions that full nodes are already aware of (set reconciliation); use IBLTs to compress transaction data, only decode new transactions, and then rebuild the block



# Scaling-Focused Developments II

- Lightning Network
  - Implements Bidirectional Payment Channels; channel can be closed at any time
  - Lightning Network will allow for routing over such payment channels
- Pegged Sidechains
  - Non-Bitcoin blockchains that support atomic entry/exit from Bitcoin
  - Supporting work for more diverse & unified cryptocurrency ecosystem

# References/Resources

- <http://blog.koehntopp.de/uploads/Chaum.BlindSigForPa>
- <http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt>
- [http://iang.org/papers/triple\\_entry.html](http://iang.org/papers/triple_entry.html)
- <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>
- <http://www.hashcash.org/>
- <https://bitcoincore.org/en/2015/12/23/capacity-increase>
- <https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0141.md>
- <https://www.blockstream.com/sidechains.pdf>

# Thank You!

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